Does Pope Leo XIV's claim that AI art lacks an ontological 'spark of humanity' hold up philosophically?

Lens adapted to this topic: Challenges to human exceptionalism

Critics argue that Leo moves too quickly from differences between present AI systems and humans to a fixed ontology of art and personhood. A work’s meaning may depend on relationships among creators, users, audiences, and cultural practices rather than on a machine’s inner life. This challenges the idea that biological embodiment is the sole source of artistic humanity.

• The claim assumes that human personhood and artistic value depend on a distinctive biological or embodied essence, an assumption critics describe as essentialist and exclusionary.
• A relational theory holds that personhood is constituted through relationships, which could make human–AI collaboration relevant to artistic meaning even if AI lacks consciousness.
• Ilia Delio argues that Leo’s traditional categories of personhood are too rigid for contemporary understandings of reality and technology.
• Human involvement remains philosophically significant in AI art: prompting, selecting, refining, framing, and presenting outputs can be intentional creative acts, even if the model itself lacks experience.

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